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Abstract 
 
 
Communication with the outside world is vital for the survival of any community, 
regardless of time and geography. This is particularly so for an island community. Lying 
uncomfortably on the North-South, East-West, Muslim-Christian divide of the Inland Sea 
in the Early Modern era, and forever wary of the threat from Barbary to the South and the 
Ottomans to the East, Hospitaller Malta lived in a constant state of readiness for war and 
in a perpetual state of dependence for subsistence on Sicily and beyond. The need to 
maintain open the lines of communication with the mainland of Europe, and to be 
constantly updated on the maritime movements of the enemy was absolutely essential for 
the survival of the island. 
 
The present study, based mostly on the outgoing correspondence of the various 
Hospitaller magistracies throughout the seventeenth century, will attempt to analyse the  
Knights’ endeavours to keep open communication lines with foreign states and territories. 
 
 
-o- 
 
Islands and their problems have elicited a privileged place in maritime historiography.  
Whether vital stations along important shipping routes or marginal places often by-passed 
by civilizations and history, their role and condition, their subsistence, their centrality to 
the flow of goods and the diffusion of cultures and, most prominently, their supposed 
isolation have much intrigued scholars of the social sciences. 
 
Braudel argues that the sea surrounding them acts as an element of both unity and 
division, yet confidently asserts that some mountain regions are more insular than many 
Mediterranean islands.
1
 Horden and Purcell energetically brush aside allegations 
concerning the remoteness and inaccessibility of many islands, dismissing as a ‘malign 
tendency’ attempts to depict them as isolated worlds.2 Matvejević labels them as 
‘particular places’ whose characteristics are inevitably determined by their geophysical 
setting and, primarily, by the distance from the mainland.
3
 Mollat du Jourdin, for whom 
islands are ‘gifts offered to the sea or lands conquered by it following seismic 
phenomena’,4  dwells on the mythical inspirations that islands have evoked in man 
throughout the millennia of his existence. In his oneiric evocations man idealized islands 
as a paradise lost, an eternal source of nostalgia,
5
 elusive Ithacas obstinately sought 
throughout lifetimes of longing and cerebral peregrination.   
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----------- 
 
Lying along vibrant shipping routes, at the very heart of the Muslim-Christian embattled 
border and less than a day’s sail from opulent Sicily, early modern Malta offers sound 
arguments to sustain with conviction the debate outlined above against the view that 
islands were isolated worlds. 
 
 
However, the scholar’s viewpoint, although privileged in many ways, not least because it 
can adopt a holistic approach and draw on a multiplicity of sources, is inevitably partial. 
Rather than the effective isolation of islands, the conceptual foundation of the present 
study is nourished by a diametrically opposite preoccupation, one which tries to assess 
the perception of isolation from within an insular context.  
 
 
Separation from the terraferma endows islanders with distinct features. It weighs on their 
relationship with the outside world. Tendentially they are of a more introspective nature, 
yet their welcome to newcomers is potentially warmer than that of mainland populations. 
Their language is different from that spoken in the nearby coast.
6
 In many ways sea 
peoples, and islanders in particular, have often been passive protagonists of history, 
adopting an attitude of anticipation. Waiting became for them a sort of ‘existential 
condition’7 – they waited for the return of a vessel, for the landing of foreigners, for the 
safe call at port of eagerly longed-for merchandise, for a cargo of life-saving victuals; 
they scrutinized the horizon in terrified anticipation of raids by sea sorcerers, hoping that 
they never materialised; they waited for a storm to abate to cross to the mainland and, 
most ardently, they waited for news.
8
  
 
 
 
Like castaways from a shipwreck, the Hospitallers landed in Malta after eight years of 
wandering and soul-searching following the loss of Rhodes in 1522.  Shadows of the 
hostility towards the island and its feasibility as a fief expressed by the Hospitaller 
Commission of 1524
9
 still permeate the documents handed down to posterity by the 
Order’s well-oiled administrative machine. In the official outgoing correspondence of 
Hospitaller Malta, the main source at the core of this study, the various Grand Masters 
hardly ever refer to the island by its proper name. One of the terms they most frequently 
used, rather than, or apart from, island, land, or domain, was scoglio - barren rock. The 
words of the Hospitaller hierarchy consistently betray a glaring lack of affection towards 
the outpost Charles V had handed them to govern. The nature of the island, the 
meagreness of its resources and the poverty of its soil, its perilous position, so inviting to 
enemy sorties from Barbary,
10
 were obsessively underlined, inflated, and pointed out to 
popes, foreign monarchs, princes, and, with an even greater vigour, to the Order’s 
emissaries and agents abroad, as if to remind them of their paramount duty to see to the 
island’s needs in the daily running of their office.  
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The Hospitallers had been grappling with the hazards of living cut off from the mainland 
for hundreds of years. The sojourn in Cyprus followed by two and a half centuries of 
permanence on Rhodes had implanted the island mentality in the Hospitaller psyche long 
before their arrival in Malta. That lingering sense of precariousness which became second 
nature to the Order’s life throughout its years in the East, in the very heart of Muslim 
territory, surrounded by water and by enemy outposts, was only heightened by the sieges 
at Rhodes and Malta in 1522 and 1565 respectively. If there was one lesson learnt by the 
Order during the siege of 1565 it was that Habsburg priorities lay elsewhere, primarily in 
the northern heart of Europe. Protestant Netherlands occupied the mind and energies of 
the Spanish king to a degree far superior than any island south of Sicily could ever have 
hoped for or aspired to.
11
 The delays and procrastination which characterised the saga of 
Don Garçia de Toledo’s relief expedition, the subject of so much controversy among 
historical circles but expertly placed in its context by Braudel,
12
 made the Order realise 
that in times of future trouble the island would probably have to stand alone again. 
 
 
Fear of possible military isolation, closely related to the siege-phobia which accompanied 
a good part of the Religion’s existence,13 ran parallel with the constant anxiety to 
provision the Maltese archipelago. Islands may not have been isolated and early modern 
Malta was certainly not, yet the Hospitaller hierarchy’s preoccupation with maintaining 
open communication channels with the mainland is one perception the historian cannot 
dismiss or ignore.
14
 Striving to keep the Convent informed and updated on the events of 
the world surrounding it, from the North Sea to the Levant, was absolutely essential in 
the ongoing struggle against isolation.  The thirst for news was comparable to the appetite 
for grain and the Order’s network of ambassadors, diplomats, and agents deployed at the 
political nerve centres of Christian Europe was certainly not sufficient to quench it. All 
potential sources of fresh news – official and otherwise – were tapped. The unexpected 
call at port of a merchant ship could result in information as revealing as that brought 
over by the galley squadron on its return from its periodic missions in the Levant.  The 
Order was very sensitive to any reverberation which the waves carried over from the East 
and Constantinople in particular. There was docked the Sultan’s armada, the source of so 
much preoccupation for the Convent. The slightest hint or rumour of feverish activity 
regarding the fitting out of the Ottoman fleet would reshuffle any agenda on the Grand 
Master’s desk. 
 
 
Like so many other aspects of the structure of the state, the system of Hospitaller Malta’s 
contacts with abroad was set on a well-defined hierarchy. Resident ambassadors were 
kept in the diplomatic powerhouses of early modern Europe such as Paris. Most 
importantly a resident ambassador was also kept in Rome,
15
 the inevitable guiding light 
for a religious institution, the much-consulted See which conditioned immeasurably the 
diplomatic activity of the Hospital. Rome did not only mean the Pope, the spiritual and 
temporal leader whose paternal approval in matters of international relevance was sought 
and longed-for by an Order which was constantly craving for justification from the 
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supreme authority in Christendom. It also meant an intricate network of unofficial 
representatives, usually cardinals, whose lobbying activity in the Papal court strove to 
gain favours for the Hospital in several matters. 
16
 
 
 
Venice, mistress of the Adriatic, architect and jealous asserter of its very own 
international policy, often independent from Habsburg necessities and Catholic stances, 
deserves to be treated separately.
17
 Its geography, privileged ties with the Ottoman world, 
overall diplomatic network, and celebrated postal service made it the prime Western 
European recipient, and indeed manipulator, of information from the East.
18
 Although the 
Republic had no resident Hospitaller ambassador, its unique capacity to provide news 
was vital for the bellicose alertness of a Mediterranean island at war with Islam and the 
Order strove constantly to draw on the Serenissima’s sources of news and diplomatic 
intelligence throughout its sojourn in Malta.
19
 The Hospitaller agents stationed in Venice 
periodically provided the Convent with what were termed the avvisi or novità del mondo, 
handwritten chronicles delivered with the normal administrative correspondence which 
were intended to update the Hospitaller community on the main happenings in Venice 
and Europe.
20
 These avvisi were primarily a product of the climate of the age. At times 
they were sent in printed format from Venice, which had developed into one of Europe’s  
major publishing hubs, or from other ports like Leghorn.
21
 The invention of printing had 
nourished the craving to publish and was slowly changing the average man’s perception 
of the surrounding environment, from local to regional and from regional to global. 
Suffice it to say that by the late sixteenth century the recollections and accounts of the 
daily life, encounters, and evangelical efforts of the Jesuit missionaries in China and 
Japan were being sent to Europe for printing.
22
  The seventeenth century in particular, 
was a century which witnessed what Villari calls a ‘boom’ in the proliferation and 
dissemination of information, a result of a general rise in the degree of political 
consciousness across all strata of society.  Strict monarchical rule throughout Europe was 
instigating a reaction to authoritarianism which manifested itself in publications, flyers, 
posters, and pamphlets with political content.
23
  
 
 
 
However, it was, perhaps, on the Tyrrhenian side of the Italian peninsula that Hospitaller 
Malta held the most pulsating of all its communication lines. The axis formed by Genoa, 
Leghorn, Naples, Messina, and Palermo was relied upon on a quasi-daily basis by the 
Convent. First and foremost came Sicily. Its grain supplies and immediate vicinity to 
Malta dictated an enduring bond between the two islands which the Order could not but 
exploit. Dispatches from Malta to the Italian mainland, when not sent directly by sea, 
were usually delivered via Palermo or Messina. A system of couriers was then employed 
to carry the dispatches to important centres like Naples, Rome, or beyond. These couriers 
can be compared to the ‘human carriers’ employed in the East, like the Chinese ‘porters’, 
who delivered news faster than the horses of Tartary or the chatirs of Persia, who 
carrying urgent letters and precious commodities could travel for hours at a stretch, 
expertly exploiting short-cuts off the main transport arteries.
24
  For more urgent news to 
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be carried by land, the Order would hire a corriero a cavallo, although more reluctantly 
due to the higher costs involved.
25
 
 
 
Notwithstanding all its flaws and shortcomings, its terrible inefficiency and unreliability, 
the communication system of an early modern state such as Hospitaller Malta was still 
capable of remarkable feats. Unmasking an impostor was one of them.
26
 Tracking down a 
renegade, an escaped prisoner, an errant knight, or a criminal on the run was another. In 
such cases the first ‘stations’ to be informed were the principal Receivers in Sicily and 
along the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy, the most obvious and likely out of all the immediate 
destinations for a Christian on the run from Malta. They were alerted in order to take 
immediate action in case the escapee happened to land in their whereabouts. In March 
1705, for example, the Order reported the flight from Malta of Hospitaller Luigi de 
Rousset, who had secretly embarked on the filuca of Antonio Buttari, docked on purpose 
for the occasion at the inlet of St Julians, with two boxes of silver lent to him by some 
creditors a few days before.
27
 Two months later de Rousset was tracked down and 
imprisoned in Naples.
28
  
 
 
 
Sicily’s land mass also acted as a point of encounter for the Hospitaller galley squadron.  
It was somewhere along the Sicilian coastline that the squadron regrouped at one stage or 
another during its wanderings around the Mediterranean. And the Sicilian coastline was 
the first destination of the filucas, saicas, or speronaras sent in trepidation by the Grand 
Master in order to re-establish contact with the squadron when too much time passed by 
without news of its whereabouts reaching the Convent.
29
 
 
 
Sicily was the terminal point of a Tyrrhenian axis which served the Order for two 
important purposes. One was that of channelling funds from its estates in Western 
Europe. Hospitaller funds from France and the Iberian Peninsula were usually collected 
in Genoa to be subsequently transported or deposited in Sicily or Malta.
30
  The other was 
that of exchanging news with the rest of the European mainland. Here again Genoa 
played a vital role, at least up to the mid-seventeenth century. Genoa was the equivalent 
of Venice on the Tyrrhenian, providing the Order with news of major events in Europe 
through the periodic dispatch of the avvisi.
31
 It also acted as a liaison for the official 
correspondence between the Hospital and the Iberian peninsula, with Madrid in 
particular.
32
 This pattern of contacts changed drastically after 1655, when an age-old 
dispute between the Order and Genoa over the question of precedence at sea came to a 
climax which ended up severing official contacts between the two states for the rest of 
the century.
33
  The outcome of the diplomatic rift not only changed Hospitaller habits in 
fund transfer, with piazzas further south along the Tyrrhenian taking over Genoa’s former 
role,
34
 it also altered routes along which correspondence was delivered to and from 
Malta. Leghorn, for example, started providing the Convent more frequently with the 
avvisi
35
 and Spanish mail started reaching Malta with greater frequency via Naples, 
which also provided the Order with the avvisi pubblici.
36
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The city-ports along the Tyrrhenian, together with Venice, enabled the Order to have a 
relatively comprehensive information network with multiple sources ensuring a greater 
coverage of international affairs and of other, lesser events, more pertinent to its day to 
day survival.   Outside the Italian peninsula, its direct line with the European mainland, 
Hospitaller Malta reached out eastwards more than anywhere else for news. The Ottoman 
threat, whether real, imminent, or simply a mental fabrication stimulated by ongoing war 
and memories of grim encounters, was a ghost that the Hospitaller and Maltese 
communities had to live with on a daily basis. This situation created a greater anticipation 
for information from the Levant than from any other corner of the Mediterranean. The 
return of the galley squadron from its seasonal missions in the East constituted the 
‘official’ and most reliable source for the Convent as regards briefing on the movements 
and intentions of the Turk. Once safe in port, the captains of the squadron would be 
summoned by the Grand Master to relate on their mission and to verify, dismiss, or 
confirm any rumours from the Levant that would have reached Malta while the 
squadron’s mission was under way.  The Order, in fact, went to considerable pains to 
verify news. When a foreign vessel, a merchant ship, or a corso expedition returning to 
cash in on its booty called at Malta’s harbour, the Order’s officials were prompt to sap all 
possible information from members of the crew. Captives and freed Christian slaves were 
also interrogated in the hope of scraping together bits of information on the situation in 
the Levant,
37
 and all this was cross-checked against other knowledge gathered by the 
Order’s ‘intelligence’ services. Hearsay and rumours were in fact rather common, even 
within diplomatic circles.
38
 
 
 
The Greek archipelago often acted as a channel through which the political and military 
climate of the eastern end of the Mediterranean reached the West. Islands provided other 
islands with information. The Maltese consul in Corfu and the Hospitaller agent, or some 
other European envoy, in Zante briefed the Convent - albeit with inevitable delays in the 
delivery – and provided news of any relevance that had filtered from Muslim quarters.39 
These contacts with the East, coupled with Malta’s frontier location and vicinity to 
Barbary, enabled the island to act as sentinel for the rest of Christendom against the 
Ottoman peril. News or rumours that reached the Convent on the movements of the 
Porte’s armada or sightings in Maltese waters or elsewhere of sizeable enemy squadrons  
were swiftly communicated to the Catholic world via Sicily and other ports and cities in 
Italy.
40
    
 
 
Malta’s role as sentry on behalf of Christendom was not restricted to military matters 
only. Rumours or verified information on plague were communicated to the European 
mainland with an even greater urgency. According to Mallia-Milanes, Hospitaller Malta’s 
health department and its severe quarantine measures rendered it a ‘bulwark’ against the 
spread of plague.
41
  If siege-phobia was not always justified, as claimed by some 
historians, no similar argument would stand against the widespread plague-phobia 
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present throughout the Mediterranean. The strict measures adopted by a state like 
Hospitaller Malta to avoid contagion in its own territory were fully justified by the 
biblical devastation periodically caused in all corners of the known world by this 
epidemic of unknown origin and for which a hapless pre-industrial medicine consistently 
failed to find any remedy. Prevention was the only defence. Solidarity, mutual 
collaboration, and special agreements between states and cities were normal occurrences. 
Genoa and Ragusa (Dubrovnik), for example, developed communication links for the 
mutual provision of political and sanitary information and warnings against plague. 
Ragusa briefed Genoa on the situation in the Balkans, Constantinople, and the Levant 
while the Genoese’ task was that of alerting the Adriatic port on any possible contagion 
in the Western Mediterranean and North Africa.
42
    
 
Rumours of a plague, whether founded or not, could cripple an early modern state and 
islands in particular. Authorities spared themselves no energy in trying to discredit any 
claims among the international community that the contagion was making headway in 
their own territory. Such rumours could travel faster than the disease itself and the very 
first precautionary measure of any state was to severe all communication with the suspect 
territory. In 1676, when the first reports of a mal contagioso in Malta were making 
headway in Europe, the Grand Master painfully and repeatedly tried to reassure the rest 
of Christendom and quash the malign and fatal gossip by attributing the isolated deaths 
on the island to the mal di stagione, a normal seasonal flu.
43
 He failed miserably. It 
proved to be a true and proper epidemic which ultimately claimed over 11,000 deaths.
44
 
Inevitably, the first ties to be severed were those with Sicily, where orders were given 
that even correspondence from Malta was to be rejected.
45
 Understandably this rang 
alarm bells for the Order, for the interruption of all sorts of contact with Sicily not only 
meant the obvious headache of finding alternative sources for provisioning the island, but 
potentially meant the first step towards the interruption of all communication with the 
much-relied upon Tyrrhenian route. On its part the Order showed itself to be mature and 
sensible enough in 1705, when it refused to interrupt trade with Pantelleria, and in turn 
contribute further to the isolation of the tiny place, after adamantly refusing to give any 
credence to rumours of the spread of plague on that island.
46
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
When the Hospital settled in Malta in1530 the island was still a remote medieval reality. 
Contacts with the outside world were mainly restricted to Sicily, domain of the Viceroys, 
feudal lords of the Maltese archipelago.
47
  The world beyond Sicily was often 
unreachable, too distant and too alien for the Maltese community. With the arrival of the 
Hospitaller Order the island’s relationship with the surrounding areas underwent a 
gradual yet dramatic change.  The Order’s religious, military, and hospitaller roles, its 
estates throughout the European mainland, and its dramatic impact on the island’s 
economy all contributed sensibly to widen, increase, improve, and intensify contacts with 
abroad, and especially with the European mainland – contacts of a commercial, 
diplomatic, financial, mercantile, informative, and at times trivial nature.
48
 With the 
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coming of the Order, Malta was not only transformed into a fortress against the advance 
of Islam and a health facility against the spread of plague, but also developed into 
Christendom’s southernmost listening station at the forefront of Western Europe’s early 
warning system against the bellicose intentions of the Infidel. Notwithstanding its meagre 
resources, Hospitaller Malta, through the exploitation of its perilous frontier position and 
its efforts to cultivate and nurture its communication channels within the Mediterranean 
and beyond, managed to carve out a special role for itself in a divided Mediterranean  
while continuing its very own struggle against isolation. 
 
 
 
LEGENDA 
 
AOM –  Archives of the Order, Malta 
 
f. - folio 
 
r. - retro 
 
v. - verso  
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